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TORTS SuRvEY: GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
This Survey examines a citizen's right to sue the government in tort ac-
tion. Specifically, the Survey focuses on two legal issues which represent the
converse of one another: the special relationship exception to the public duty
doctrine, and the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA).'
The common law public duty doctrine protects the government against
suits rising out of negligent acts by government officials. This immunity,
however, does not apply where the injured individual can show that a "special
relationship" existed between herself and the government. In Taylor v. Phelan,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled on the special
relationship exception to the public duty doctrine for the first time.2 The court
construed the exception narrowly, and upheld a summary judgment for the
Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department in an action alleging breach of
duty.3 As discussed below, the court's decision is consistent with other courts'
narrow interpretation of the special relationship exception.
In Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, the Tenth Circuit barred a
private party's suit against the United States Government under the FTCA for
wrongful death and for negligent destruction of private property.4 The court
granted the government immunity under the FTCA's discretionary function
exception.' While acknowledging the function of government liability under
the FTCA,6 the court gave force to the discretionary function exception.7 Un-
der the court's broad interpretation, the exception threatens to swallow the
rule.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 1993).
3. Id. at 887.
4. 34 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 1994).
5. Id. at 972-76.
6. Id. at 972.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The exception provides that the FTCA shall not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regu-
lation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
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I. THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION
A. Background
The public duty doctrine provides immunity for state and local govern-
ments in situations where, had the defendant not been a public agent or entity,
she would be liable to an injured party for a breach of duty. The public duty
doctrine grew out of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which protected
governmental entities from tort liability. Sovereign immunity applied to feder-
al, state, and local governments, and arose out of the English maxim that "the
King can do no wrong."' In the United States, courts interpreted this immuni-
ty to mean that the government could not be sued without its consent.' Gener-
ally, sovereign immunity provided judicial protection when the tortious con-
duct represented a "function" of the government.' Given its broadest inter-
pretation, however, sovereign immunity amounted to blanket protection for the
state and its agents in tort claims."
Occasionally recognized as the "duty to all, duty to no one" doctrine,1
2
the public duty doctrine rests on the principle that because the government
owes a duty to the public in general, it does not owe a duty to any individual
citizen. 3 The doctrine originated in the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in South v. Maryland.4 In South, a county sheriff refused to arrest the
plaintiff's alleged kidnappers and extortionists. The plaintiff sued the sheriff
for nonfeasance-failing to protect the plaintiff from kidnapping and extor-
tion."' The Court held that the sheriff could not be held liable for the breach
of a public duty, 6 the preservation of which he was required to uphold. 7
The Court, relying on common law principles, reasoned that the sheriff, as an
agent of the state, was only subject to civil liability in two circumstances.
First, the agent could be liable if he or she was acting in a ministerial capaci-
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1043
(5th ed. 1984).
9. Regarding federal government immunity, see United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 286, 288 (1846) (noting that "the government is not liable to be sued, except with its own
consent, given by law," and denying relief to the plaintiff who sought to have the United States
enjoined from pursuing a judgment against him). As discussed below, this immunity continued
until the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. Regarding state government immunity,
see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1890).
10. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 978-79. Professor Prosser noted that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity divided government activities into two categories. Governmental func-
tions-activities that can only be performed by the government--received immunity from tort
liability. Id. Proprietary functions-activities that other entities could adequately perform and
from which the government receives revenue-were not immune. Id. at 980-81; see also STUART
M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERiCAN LAW OF TORTS § 6:9 (1985) (distinguishing governmental
functions from proprietary functions).
11. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 131.
12. See Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159-60 (Colo. 1986).
13. Id. at 195.
14. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
15. Id. at 398-99.
16. Id. at 402-03.
17. Id. at 403.
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ty." Second, the agent could be liable if his or her acts maliciously frustrated
a person's enjoyment of a "special individual right, privilege or franchise."' 9
Attempting to limit the government's potential liability for acts of government
employees or agents, courts began to adopt South's public duty doctrine."
Like the function of sovereign immunity, the public duty doctrine protected
public officers and agents. Courts following the doctrine pointed to the need to
protect the government from the delays, expense, and burdens accompanying
civil litigation.2' According to this reasoning, the government's efforts are
better spent performing traditional duties and obligations.
The public duty doctrine as enunciated in South, however, has met in-
creasing criticism.22 In some jurisdictions, courts have rejected the doctrine
all together.2 These courts pointed to the inequity of limiting the
government's liability as a tortfeasor, and to the potential hardship to victims.
Additionally, some state have abrogated the doctrine through legislation.24
Even those jurisdictions which follow the public duty doctrine, however,
do not provide the government with blanket, all encompassing protection.
Courts have provided exceptions which have narrowed the scope of protection.
18. Id. at 402-03.
19. Id. at 403.
20. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (holding that the Creek Nation,
like states and municipalities, was free from liability arising from injuries to persons and property
due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace); Cameron v. Janssen Bros. Nurseries, Ltd., 7
F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that public duty doctrine barred suit against agricultural depart-
ment for allegedly failing to monitor fumigator); Turbe v. V.I., 938 F.2d 427 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(while holding that Virgin Island Water and Power Authority did not owe a duty to plaintiff to
repair street lights, the court noted that the Virgin Islands have a limited form of tort immunity);
Reiser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (concluding that the public duty
doctrine prevented a suit against the department of corrections for failing to disclose parolee's past
sexual convictions); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that state
child abuse law created duty to the general public, but could not support an individual's cause of
action).
21. See Massengill v. Yuma County, 456 P.2d 376, 380-81 (Ariz. 1969) (contending that if
the protection afforded by the public duty doctrine was abolished, the government's potential
liability would be overwhelming); cf. Leak v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Colo. 1886) (noting
that the loss of protection from the doctrine would have financial ramifications upon the govern-
ment).
22. See generally SPEISER ET AL., supra note 10, § 6:11.
23. Three of the six states that make up the Sixth Circuit have explicitly abrogated govern-
mental immunity. See Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986) (holding Commerce City liable
in wrongful death action when police officers released a minor who they knew was intoxicated
and who a short time later struck and killed two pedestrians); Schear v. Board of County Comm'r,
687 P.2d 728 (N.M. 1984) (concluding that the public duty doctrine, as part of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, was abolished by state's tort claim law); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643
(Wyo. 1986) (holding public duty doctrine inconsistent with legislature's abolition of sovereign
immunity); see also Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982) (concluding that the state's duty of
care parallels that of a private party); Stewart v. Schmeider, 836 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980).
24. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.50.250-.300 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.14 (1986); IDAHO
CODE §§ 6-901 to -928 (1979); LA. CONST. of 1974 art. XII § 10; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§§ 8101-8118 (West 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-6 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.260-
.300 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-1 to -7 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5601-5605
(1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.010-.200 (1988); see also William N. Drake, Jr. & Rich-
ard D. Oldham, III, The King Is Dead, Long Live the Emperor: Commercial Carrier Decision and
the Status of Governmental Immunity in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 504-09 (1979) (analyzing the law in
Florida in the aftermath of the legislature's abolition of the state's immunity under the public duty
doctrine).
19951
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The most prominent and broadest of these exceptions allows for a cause of
action in negligence when the police fail to provide adequate protection. To
trigger the exception, the plaintiff must show that a special relationship existed
between herself and the police. Generally, a special relationship exists where
the police single out an individual from the general public and provide that
person with special attention or treatment.
In the seminal case, Schuster v. New York,25 the New York Court of Ap-
peals, while recognizing the public duty doctrine's applicability to the police
department,26 denied the city's motion to dismiss an action against the city
and police department for failing to protect an informant.2 The informant,
after providing the police with information which led to the apprehension and
arrest of a fugitive, began to receive death threats. The informant told the
police about the death threats and expressed concern over his safety. The
police, however, did not provide any protection. Three weeks after receiving
the threats, the informant was shot and killed outside his home. Basing its
reasoning on reciprocity,28 the court held that a special relationship existed
that altered the traditional police duty under the public duty doctrine.29 Due
to the nature of the relationship between the informer and the police, the court
reasoned that the police owed a "special duty to use reasonable care for the
protection of persons who aid in the arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it
reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration.' 30
Courts often cite, yet rarely apply, Schuster's special relationship excep-
tion." Plaintiffs generally invoke the exception in one of three limited situa-
tions.32 First, a special relationship may be found when the legislature,
through the enactment of a statute or ordinance, expresses an intent to provide
protection to a class of which the victim is a member.33 Under this situation,
the court is simply enforcing the legislature's mandate. Second, as in Schuster,
a special relationship exists when the plaintiff is injured as a result of her
efforts and actions in aiding the police. 4 Third, similar to contract law's the-
25. 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958).
26. Id. at 537.
27. Id.
28. Id. The court noted that since members of the general public owe a duty to aid the police
in law enforcement, the police, in turn, owe a duty to protect citizens when their efforts place
them in danger. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Cameron v. Janssen Bros. Nurseries, Ltd., 7 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1993); Louie v. Unit-
ed States, 776 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1985); Texaus Inv. Corp. v. Haendiges, 761 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1985); see generally Turbe v. V.I., 938 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1991) (while holding that Virgin Island
Water and Power Authority did not owe a duty to plaintiff to repair street lights, the court noted
that the Virgin Islands had a limited form of tort immunity).
32. See John C. McMillan, Jr., Note, Government Liability and the Public Duty Doctrine, 32
VILL. L. REv. 505, 515-16 (1987).
33. Id. at 516 (citing Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a
state drunk driving statute created duty of the police to arrest driver when found to be legally
intoxicated); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 530 P.2d 234 (Wash. 1975) (finding that city ordi-
nance created a special duty on the part of the electrical inspector to reasonably handle and dis-
connect electrical system)).
34. McMillan, supra note 32, at 516 (citations omitted).
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ory of promissory estoppel,35 a special relationship exists when the injured
party, through direct contact with an agent or entity of the government, detri-
mentally relied on express or implied assurances made by the government
agent or entity."
While courts have recognized the special relationship exception, the ex-
ception has limitations. Courts have refused to allow a cause of action when
the nexus between the two parties is too attenuated or lacks sufficient intima-
cy. Deficiencies in the relationship between the private party plaintiff and the
government generally fall in one of three categories. 7 Under the first catego-
ry, courts will not impose liability against the government when the agent,
aware of a specific and identifiable source of danger, is unable to reasonably
foresee a specific victim.3" Under a second category, courts will not impose
liability upon the government when the agent, while able to foresee a specific
and identifiable harm to a specific and identifiable victim, did not place the
victim in danger through any affirmative acts.39 Finally, under the third cate-
gory, courts will not impose liability on the government when the government
agent is aware of a broad form of danger, but fails to provide protection
against the danger.'
B. Taylor v. Phelan
1. Facts
On September 25, 1986, Michael and Brenda Taylor discovered that their
daughter was assaulted and sexually molested by Michael Moore, Mr. Taylor's
cousin.4' The incident occurred when Mr. Moore accompanied the Taylors on
a trip to Kansas City, Missouri.42 The Taylors learned of the event eleven
months later. After several medical examinations and consultations with social
workers, the Taylors, on October 21, 1986, contacted the Kansas City, Missou-
ri Police Department.43 The Taylors' case was assigned to Detective Paula
Phelan in the Sex Crimes Unit. On October 22, 1986, the Taylors filed a re-
port with Detective Phelan," who videotaped an interview of the Taylors'
daughter. 5 In the interview, the daughter described to Detective Phelan how
Mr. Moore sexually assaulted her.'
35. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACrs § 12.1 (2d ed. 1990).
36. McMillan, supra note 32, at 516-17 n.46 ("The rationale applied most frequently by
judges finding a duty to provide police protection where the plaintiff relied on assurances of such
protection, is that they are merely compelling police to perform a ministerial act in fulfilling their
voluntarily assumed obligations."). Cf. Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 643 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1982).
37. McMillan, supra note 32, at 518.
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 518-19 (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 519.




44. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 884.
45. Id. at 885.
46. Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1097.
1995]
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Two days after the interview, Mr. Moore voluntarily turned himself in to
the Kansas City Police Department for questioning. Mr. Moore was released
that day on his agreement to submit to a polygraph examination scheduled for
October 28.' On the day of the scheduled polygraph examination, Mr. Moore
contacted Detective Phelan and informed her that he did not wish to take the
exam. Later that day, Mr. Moore called Detective Phelan back and told her
that he had changed his mind and now wished to take the examination.' The
examination was rescheduled for the following day, but Mr. Moore never ap-
peared for the rescheduled examination.49
During the week of October 24, plaintiffs made several calls to Detective
Phelan. The Taylors told the Detective that they were concerned for their
safety because Mr. Moore lived in close proximity to their home." Detective
Phelan advised them to continue with their daily routine, and told them not to
worry.
5'
The following week, Detectives Phelan and Wessler went to the Taylors'
home in Kansas City, Kansas, to obtain medical reports. Again, the Taylors
expressed concern for their safety and pointed out Mr. Moore's close proximi-
ty to their home.52 Detective Phelan responded that they were "paranoid" and
assured Mrs. Taylor that everything was being done to investigate the incident
and that a warrant would soon be issued for Mr. Moore's arrest.53 Over the
next ten days, the Taylors continued to contact the Sex Crimes Unit to check
on the status of the arrest warrant and to voice concern for their safety. 4
On November 7, 1986, the Clay County Circuit Court issued a warrant for
Mr. Moore's arrest on sodomy and sexual abuse charges." That day, Detec-
tive Wessler telephoned Mr. Moore and told him that a warrant had been
issued for his arrest.56 Mr. Moore told Detective Wessler that he would vol-
untarily surrender the next day, 7 but this was the last contact between Mr.
Moore and the police. He failed to turn himself in to the police the next day.
After the issuance of the warrant, the Taylors telephoned Detective Phelan and
expressed their concern over the delay in arresting Mr. Moore." Detective
Phelan continued to assure them that all efforts were being made, and told
them not to worry. 9
Five days after the issuance of the arrest warrant, Mr. Moore broke into
the Taylor's home, shot Mr. Taylor in the face, barricaded himself in a room
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1097-98.
50. Id. Both Mr. Moore and the Taylors lived in Kansas City, Kansas.
51. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 885. The Taylors inquired, while Mr. Moore's arrest was pending,
whether they should remove their children from school.
52. Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1098.
53. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 885.
54. Id.
55. Id. Because Mr. Moore lived in Kansas, the Missouri police were required to seek the
assistance of Kansas law enforcement.
56. Id.





with the Taylors' two children, poured gasoline over the children, and set
them on fire. The Taylors' daughter died as a result of her injuries, and their
son sustained severe bums. After setting the children afire, Mr. Moore com-
mitted suicide.'
2. Opinion
Circuit Judge Brorby, writing for a unanimous Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, first held that Kansas law applied to the case.6 He then narrowed
the issue to whether a special relationship existed between the police depart-
ment-through the action of its agent, Detective Phelan-and the Taylors
which would defeat the immunity afforded the police department under the
public duty doctrine.6"
The court explained that a special relationship between the police and a
member of the general public exists in two circumstances.63 First, a special
police duty arises when a specific act on the part of the police caused an inju-
ry. Second, a special duty exists when specific promises or representations by
the police create a "justifiable reliance."'
The Taylors, however, made three arguments for the application of the
special relationship exception. First, the Taylors argued that under Schuster v.
City of New York,65 Detective Phelan's assurances of safety or lack of danger
amounted to a promise.' The court, stating that Kansas law required-and
Schuster implied-a "specific promise" on the part of the police, characterized
the Detective's statements to the Taylors as mere "blanket assurances.' 67 The
court reasoned that because police regularly make such assurances, "invok[ing]
an exception to the general duty doctrine on similar remarks would virtually
swallow the rule.""
The Taylors' second argument asserted that Detective Wessler's telephone
call to Mr. Moore notifying Mr. Moore of his pending arrest amounted to an
affirmative act." The Taylors reasoned that this affirmative act caused their
injury. The court held, however, that the special relationship exception re-
quired the affirmative act to be more than a single 'but for' incident. It re-
60. Id.
61. Id. The court, in upholding the District Court's ruling below, held that the diversity of
parties to the conflict provided jurisdiction over the dispute and that the issue of choice of law
was correctly decided by the court below. The lower court held that "[a] federal court sitting in
diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, including that state's choice
of law rules." Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1098 (citing Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 814 F. Supp.
460, 465 (D. Kan. 1988)). This procedural ruling had a great impact on the case. Missouri law did
not recognize the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. Additionally, Missouri
law offered governmental entities and their employees much greater immunity protection than did
Kansas law. Id. at 1098-99.
62. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 885-86.
63. Id. at 886. The court cited Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 667 P.2d 380 (Kan. 1983), in
which the Kansas Supreme Court delineated two circumstances creating special relationships.
64. Id. (citing Dauffenbach, 667 P.2d at 385). See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
65. 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958).





DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
quired the affirmative act "to be a direct cause of an injury, and not merely a
contributing cause."7 The court reasoned that, "[e]ven assuming the Missouri
police increased the risk of injury through their actions or inaction, the Taylors
do not argue the police directly caused them harm.'
Finally, the Taylors argued that a special relationship arose when the
police allegedly compelled the Taylors to cooperate in Mr. Moore's arrest,
knowing that such cooperation placed the Taylors in danger.72 The Taylors
reasoned that they were members of a special class which commanded special
police protection. The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
while acknowledging the support for this reasoning in other jurisdictions,73
the court held that the Taylors' view extended the special relationship excep-
tion beyond Kansas's existing law. Second, the court held that the Taylors had
failed to show membership within a special class.74 The court noted that other
cases recognizing the special class argument required that the police compelled
or persuaded the individual into cooperating with law enforcement. 7 The
court found that the Taylors, in contrast, had volunteered, and were not solicit-
ed for help.76
3. Analysis
In the Phelan decision, the Tenth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the
special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine virtually eliminates
its applicability. Despite the court's acknowledgement of the exception, it is
difficult to imagine facts which would allow a private tort suit to proceed
against a state or municipal government.
The court's dismissal of the Taylors' first argument illustrates the court's
reluctance to apply the exception. The court held that the police department
did not make a representation or a promise that the Taylor family would be
protected. The court insisted that Kansas law requires a "specific promise."77
This assertion, however, has little support under Kansas law. The court pointed
to Hendrix v. City of Topeka78 as a precedent requiring a specific promise by
the government agent or entity. While the Hendrix court did find that a spe-
cific promise could defeat government immunity, it did not hold that such a
promise was necessary. Instead, the Kansas Supreme Court distinguished spe-
cific promises from "representations," and held that either one alone could
create a cause of action.79 Moreover, the Hendricks court pointed to the New
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that the leading Kansas cases on the subject required the affirmative
act to be a direct cause of the injury. Id.; see Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 667 P.2d 380 (Kan.
1983); Hendrix v. City of Topeka, 643 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1982); Bradford v. Mahan, 548 P.2d 1223
(Kan. 1976); Gardner v. McDowell, 451 P.2d 501 (Kan. 1969).





77. Id. at 886.
78. 643 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1982).
79. Id. at 137. The court stated that "[liability against a police officer may be predicated
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York high court's decision in Schuster as support for their interpretation of the
special relationship exception."0 Schuster found that a special relationship
exists where, as in Taylor, the police had "impart[ed] ... a false impression
of safety and lack of danger."
8'
Taylor marks the Tenth Circuit's departure from the broader interpretation
of the exception provided in Schuster and endorsed in Hendrix. The argument
that the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department made representations to
provide safety is consistent with Schuster, which is widely cited in Kansas
cases.82 Detective Phelan's assurances that the Taylors were not in danger
and that their fears over safety amounted to "paranoia"83 clearly imparted an
understanding of safety or lack of danger, albeit a false one. In light of the
court's specific promise requirement, however, the assurances and representa-
tions of safety were insufficient to overcome the government's immunity. 4
The court's refusal to accept the Taylors' second argument also represents
a departure from previous cases involving the special relationship test. In
Taylor, the Tenth Circuit required that the government entity directly cause the
injury. While the court did cite Kansas cases where the government entity was
the direct cause of injury," it did not cite any cases that specifically required
direct causation, or any cases that refused to provide relief without this con-
nection. This causation requirement contradicts the landmark cases that provid-
ed the foundation for the special relationship exception. 6
Finally, the court held that police solicitation for citizen cooperation
that-with reasonable foreseeability-endangered the citizen does not create a
special relationship, and that such a reading would require the court to expand
Kansas law. 7 The court's controlling precedent was Dauffenbach v. City of
Wichita," which delineated only two circumstances amounting to a special
relationship--a specific promise or direct causation." Other Kansas courts,
however, have considered the Taylors' third argument." The Tenth Circuit, in
relying so heavily on Dauffenbach while ignoring other Kansas cases consider-
ing this argument, seemed apprehensive to apply the exception on less than
upon breach of specific promise or representations." Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. (citing Schuster v. City of New York, 154 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1958)).
81. See Taylor, 9 F.3d at 886.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 885.
84. The court referred to the police assurances of safety as "blanket assurances," and rea-
soned that such assurances were regularly made by police in the performance of their duties. Id. at
886.
85. Id. at 886-87 (citing Bradford v. Mahan, 548 P.2d 1223 (Kan. 1976) and Gardner v.
McDowell, 451 P.2d 501 (1969)).
86. In Schuster, for example, there was no evidence that any member of the police depart-
ment murdered the informant. Rather, the court found the police guilty of not providing protection
to the informant. The police act, therefore, represented a cause of the death, but certainly not a
direct or proximate cause. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30 for a discussion of Schuster.
87. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 887.
88. 667 P.2d 380 (Kan. 1983).
89. Id. at 385. The court stated that a duty arises: "(1) where there is an affirmative act by
the officer causing the injury; and (2) when a specific promise or representation by the officer is
made under circumstances creating justifiable reliance." Id.
90. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 887.
1995]
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solid ground. The court's wariness resulted in its narrow interpretation of the
special relationship exception.
Additionally, while required to apply Kansas law,9 the court may have
been reluctant to subject the employees of Kansas City, Missouri to Kansas's
special relationship exception because Missouri, unlike Kansas, does not rec-
ognize the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine.92
With its decision in Phelan v. Taylor, the Tenth Circuit appears to have
joined other courts' efforts to reduce the impact of the special relationship
exception to the public duty doctrine. Taylor's facts do not significantly differ
from other cases which applied the exception. The court, through its decision,
narrowed the requirements needed to claim the exception.
II. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT
A. Background
Before Congress's adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),93
members of the general public could not sue the federal government for negli-
gent acts committed by government agents or officials. Regardless of the
merits of the case, the common law tradition of sovereign immunity-where
the "king can do no wrong"- prevented a citizen's suit from going for-
ward.
94
Those seeking redress could, however, file a request for compensatory
relief through a private congressional claim bill.95 As more claim bills were
filed, however, administration of these claims became unwieldy and over-
whelming.96 Congress, seeking a more manageable solution, introduced the
FTCA in 1946."7 Through the FTCA, Congress sought to impose liability
91. In upholding the district court's application of Kansas law, the court reasoned that
"[flederal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law, including choice of law rules,
of the state in which they sit." Id. at 885 (citing Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l Inc.,
778 F.2d 547, 549 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Slentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941))).
92. Taylor, 799 F. Supp. at 1098-99. The defendants argued that "subjecting them to suit in
Kansas without affording them the sovereign and official immunity to which they would be enti-
tled under Missouri law [would] interfere significantly with their capacity to fulfill their sovereign
responsibilities" and "would have a chilling effect on investigations crossing the state line." Id.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
94. For a more detailed discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
95. Private claim bills require a considerable amount of political will. Bills must be intro-
duced by a member of Congress, deliberated in the Committee on Claims, and then submitted to
Congress for a consent by vote (the vote must be unanimous). The claims bill, on consent by both
houses, then requires the President's final approval. See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort
Claims Against the Federal Government, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323-26 (1942); see
also Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act, 26 GA. L. REv. 837, 860 n.2 (1992).
96. From 1939 to 1942, 6,300 bills were introduced in Congress. Walter P. Armstrong &
Howard Cockrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 9 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoBS. 327, 327 n.3
(1942); see Goldman, supra note 95, at 860 n.2 (noting that during World War II, the claims bills
became particularly problematic for a nation with energy and resources committed elsewhere).
97. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
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upon the United States "to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances." '
The FTCA, however, provides several exceptions to this maxim." The
focus of this section is the discretionary function exception,"r which has
generated considerable litigation.' Under the exception, the United States is
immune from liability for any act or omission "based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused."'
0 2
Since the FTCA's adoption, courts have struggled over the meaning and
breadth of the discretionary function exception. In 1953, the United States
Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. United States,"3 broadly interpreted the ex-
ception and the meaning of "discretionary." In Dalehite, hundreds of people
were killed in an explosion in Texas City, Texas in 1947. The cause of the
explosion was the Government's negligent handling of ammonium nitrate. The
government was in the process of shipping the chemical, a fertilizer base, to
the French government. The Court held that the discretionary function excep-
tion barred a suit against the government."° The Court reasoned that the plan
to export the chemical, 5 and the implementation of that plan, involved gov-
ernmental discretion, thereby placing it within the meaning of the excep-
tion."°  The Court noted that the discretionary function exception "includes
more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determina-
tions made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications
or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion.
' 
07
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,"°a the Court pointed to its hold-
ing in Dalehite and introduced a new test to determine whether a government
act was "discretionary." The Court, in finding the Coast Guard liable for fail-
ing to maintain a lighthouse beacon,"° distinguished "operational" and "plan-
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988). The exceptions include: discretionary functions of government
agents; negligent transmission of postal material; claims arising from tax or customs matters;
claims for title 50 administration; claims for United States quarantine decisions; certain law en-
forcement matters; claims for damages from fiscal operations of the treasury; claims for military
activities in time of war; claims arising in foreign countries; claims arising from the activities of
the Tennessee Valley Authority; claims arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company;
and claims arising from the activities of a federal land bank or intermediate credit bank or a bank
of cooperatives. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
101. As discussed below, since its inception in 1946, the United States Supreme Court has
given considerable attention to the discretionary function exception.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
103. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
104. Id. at 36.
105. Id. at 37.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 35-36. While initially denied recovery because of the discretionary function excep-
tion, the victims of the explosion eventually recovered some damages through Congressional
claims bills.
108. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
109. In Indian Towing, the plaintiff sued the government for cargo lost when the plaintiff's
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ning" functions. The Court held that the discretionary function exception
barred suits implicating government functions at the planning stage,' 0 but al-
lowed suits implicating government functions at the operational stage."'
Lower courts over the next thirty years adopted and applied the plan-
ning/operational test."2
When the Court revisited the discretionary function thirty years later in
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense ("Varig Air-
lines"),' it departed from Indian Towing's planning/operational distinction,
and adopted a focus on the "nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor."' ' In Varig Airlines, the Court extended protection under the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Aviation Administration's planning
and implementation of aircraft safety regulations.' The Court found that the
governmental immunity included the decision to implement a spot-check pro-
gram on aircraft,"6 as well as the actions of the individual inspectors execut-
ing the spot-checks. In extending immunity to individual FAA inspectors, the
Court reasoned that the inspectors employed discretion in the execution of the
regulation.' After Varig Airlines, operational activities, even by lower level
government employees, were no longer always subject to liability.'"
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the Varig Airlines analysis in
Berkovitz v. United States.' The Court, while finding the discretionary func-
tion exception inapplicable to the Food and Drug Administration's failure to
follow vaccine approval mandates, 20 did not rely on the planning/operational
test from Indian Towing. Instead, the court held that the exception only applies
to policies allowing government discretion in execution, rather than those
policies-like the FDA policy before the Court-requiring strict adherence to
ship ran aground. The plaintiff alleged that the Coast Guard's failure to maintain the lighthouse
beacon caused the ship to lose its way. Id. at 62.
110. Id. at 64-69.
111. Id.
112. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal
Liability in Tort, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 871, 880 (1991) (noting the adoption of the plan-
ning/operational test in various forms by lower courts); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discre-
tionary function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time For Reconsideration, 42 OKLA.
L. REv. 459, 461 (observing that the planning/operational test became standard practice).
113. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
114. Id. at 813.
115. Id. at 821.
116. Id. at 819-20. The Court acknowledged that the decision to perform a spot-check in-
volved considerations of safety goals and budgetary considerations. Id.
117. Id. at 820. The court pointed to the individual inspector's judgment involved in assessing
the confidence in a given manufacturer, in maximizing compliance with FAA regulations, and in
determining the efficient allocation of agency resources. Id.
118. See Goldman, supra note 95, at 884. But see Krent, supra note 112, at 881 (noting that
after Varig Airlines, many lower courts continued to use the planning/operational test).
119. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
120. Id. at 547. The Berkovitzs sued the United States on two grounds. First, they alleged that
the Department of Biological Standards, a branch of the National Institute of Health, negligently
licensed a pharmaceutical company to produce orimune, an oral polio vaccine. Second, they al-
leged that the Food and Drug Administration negligently approved the disbursement of a particular
lot of Orimune. A dose of Orimune ingested by the Berkovitz's two month old child caused him
to contract polio, leaving him almost completely paralyzed.
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prescribed mandates.'2' Most importantly, the Court set forth a two step ap-
proach to determine whether the discretionary function exception protects
government actions from liability.'22 First, courts must determine whether
Congress endowed the government official with the discretion to make a
choice.'23 If no discretion to make a choice exists, the exception does not
apply. If, on the other hand, the official has some discretion, the reviewing
court must make a second determination. The court must determine whether
this discretion is the type Congress intended to immunize from liability. The
Court reasoned that Congress desired to prevent judicial second-guessing of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, or politi-
cal policy.' Therefore, the exception prevented courts from evaluating gov-
ernment decisions for tort liability in matters grounded in social, economic, or
political policy.
In its latest visit with the discretionary function exception, the Court, in
United States v. Gaubert,'25 officially rejected the planning/operational test
for a broader interpretation of the discretionary function test. The Court looked
to the government act in dispute and, without regard to the level at which it
was executed, analyzed whether discretion was employed.'26 The Court ex-
plained that "a discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there
is nothing in [the FTCA] ... description that refers exclusively to
policymaking or planning functions.... Discretionary conduct is not confined
to the policy or planning level."'27 The Court then applied the two step
Berkovitz test. First, it determined the degree of discretion the regulation or
statute provided the agent or officer.'28 Second, it determined whether the
agent or officer, in exercising this discretion, considered the social, economic,
or political policy in the regulation or statute. 29
While it is unclear how lower courts will ultimately apply Bekovitz and
Gaubert, they now have greater latitude in finding discretionary immunity.
121. Id. at 546-47.
122. Id. at 536-39.
123. Id. at 536.
124. Id. at 536-37. See generally David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Func-
tion Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV.
291.
125. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
126. In Gaubert, federal regulators assumed control of the Independent American Savings and
Loan, which the plaintiff owned. The regulators assumed such day-to-day management as recom-
mendations of consultants and officers, advisement over subsidiary investments, and recommend-
ing that the savings and loan switch to a federal charter. After assuming control, the savings and
loan diminished to a negative net worth of $400 million. The plaintiff, having suffered personal
losses of $100 million, sued the government, alleging negligence in its day-to-day management.
Id. at 319-20; see generally Carolyn K. Dick, United States v. Gaubert: Potential Liability for
Federal Regulations Under the "Discretionary Function" Exception of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 36 S.D. L. REv. 180 (1991).
127. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.
128. Id. at 328.
129. Id. at 332-33.
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B. Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States
1. Facts
In Black Hills, the plaintiffs brought action against the United States un-
der the FTCA, seeking damages for the wrongful death of Nathan Kolb and
for the negligent destruction of the aircraft he was operating. The plaintiffs
also alleged that the government was negligent in its investigation of the air-
craft crash. 30
The crash occurred on the United States Army White Sands Missile
Range, located in New Mexico. 3' Civilians may not enter the installation
without Army access permits, which are granted on a case-by-case basis. In
1987, the Army and the Department of Defense conducted ground-to-air mis-
sile tests on the installation for the Forward Area Air Defense System
(FAADS). As part of FAADS, the Department of Defense contracted with
Black Hills Aviation for aerial fire suppression services.'
On September 10, 1987, a FAADS missile started a fire on the installa-
tion. Black Hills Aviation dispatched an aircraft in response to an Army re-
quest for aerial fire suppression. Nathan Kolb and a co-pilot,'33 both employ-
ees of Black Hills Aviation, flew the aircraft, Tanker 07.
Tanker 07 obtained authorization to enter the missile range's airspace
from the air controller. Tanker 07 crashed fifteen miles into the interior of the
missile range and inside the FAADS testing site, killing both pilots.'34
An attorney from the Army Judge Advocate General's (JAG) office, antic-
ipating litigation concerning the crash, contacted the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and the Army Safety Center and inquired whether they
wished to investigate the crash. Both declined to investigate the crash.'35
Pursuant to Army regulations, the Army appointed a colonel to investigate
the facts and circumstances of the crash.'36 The investigation covered only
the Army's activities regarding the crash; it did not seek to determine the
cause of the crash.
Arnold Kolb, Nathan Kolb's father and the owner of the Tanker 07, re-
quested access to the crash site. The Army allowed: (1) an overflight of the
crash site on September 11, 1987; (2) a visit to the crash site in its undis-
130. 34 F.3d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1994). This Survey is limited to a discussion of the
plaintiff's claims relating to the Army's investigation and recovery of crash. The district court
allowed summary judgment in favor of the government, holding that the plaintiff had failed to
establish a material fact concerning the government's involvement. Id. at 972.
131. Id. at 970.
132. Id.
133. While the co-pilot had over forty years of experience, the flight was the pilot's first
flight without an instructor. Id. at 970-71.
134. Army records showed that the only missile fired near the time of the crash was the one
which started the fire. Id. at 972. That missile was fired approximately two hours before the crash.
Id. at 970.
135. The NTSB indicated, however, that it would investigate the crash if specifically request-
ed to do so by the missile range installation. Id.




turbed state on September 23, 1987; (3) a visit to the site in late February,
1988, to disassemble the landing gear of the aircraft; and (4) a visit to the
crash site area in late March, 1988, to retrieve the aircraft wreckage, which
had been airlifted to a range road.'37
In February, 1988, after allowing Arnold Kolb access to the crash site and
after obtaining his consent, the Army broke the aircraft into smaller pieces and
brought it down to an access road where Arnold Kolb could recover it. The
Army did not allow the Kolbs to perform their own investigation of the crash
site or allow them to participate in the Army's investigation. 3
When the Army completed its investigation report on December 7, 1987,
the Kolbs learned for the first time that the Army's investigation had not
sought to determine the cause of the crash. A few weeks later, the Kolbs be-
gan their own investigation of the crash. The Kolbs hired a team of aircraft
accident investigation experts. The experts analyzed the aircraft debris, and
found evidence that an external force had affected the aircraft before the crash.
For example, the coroner discovered a cone shaped piece of metal in the co-
pilot's back that did not match any part of the aircraft. 39 Additionally, the
experts discovered markings on a turbine blade in the right jet engine, indicat-
ing that an event had occurred on the right side of the aircraft just before the
crash."4
The plaintiffs sought damages for the wrongful death of Nathan Kolb and
for the negligent destruction of the aircraft. The plaintiffs also alleged that the
government tortiously failed to investigate the cause of the crash, tortiously
spoiled and destroyed evidence in the case, and committed the tort of trespass
to chattel or conversion regarding the aircraft's wreckage.
The district court barred the plaintiff's four claims regarding the investiga-
tion and recovery of crash debris, citing the FTCA's discretionary function
exception. 4'
2. Opinion
Judge Van Bebber,42 writing for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
upheld the district court's finding that the plaintiff's claims were barred under
the discretionary function exception.'43
Judge Van Bebber began his opinion by endorsing the two prong test for
the discretionary function exception from Berkovitz and Gaubert.'" First, the
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 971-72.
140. Id. at 972.
141. Id. at 970.
142. United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. Id. at 968.
143. Id. at 970. As indicated in supra note 130, this discussion is limited to the court's deci-
sion regarding the FrCA.
144. The court noted that the discretionary function exception represented "the boundary be-
tween Congress' [sic] willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to
protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals." Id. at 972
(quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808). For a more complete discussion of Berkovitz and
Gaubert, and the tests they endorsed, see supra text accompanying notes 119-29.
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governmental act must involve judgement or choice. Second, this discretion
must be the kind that Congress-through the discretionary function excep-
tion-sought to protect.'45
The plaintiffs argued that Army regulations required an investigation into
the cause of the crash, placing the Army outside the ambit of the exception.
Specifically, the plaintiffs pointed to Department of Defense Instruction 6055.7
(DOD Instruction 6055.7), which establishes basic accident investigation crite-
ria and requires each branch of the military to promulgate specific regulations
implementing these criteria. 46
The plaintiffs argued that two of three regulations promulgated under
DOD 6055.7 obligated the government to investigate the crash. 47 First, the
government was required to perform a "Legal Mishap Investigation."'"6 Le-
gal investigations are triggered by specified factors, such as death. The Army
performs a legal investigation to determine responsibility for an accident. Sec-
ond, the government was required to perform a "safety" investigation. Safety
investigations serve to prevent the reoccurrence of mishaps. 49
In affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit held that the
DOD 6055.7 was inapplicable because it was limited to DOD mishaps, and
held that the crash did not fall under the definition of a DOD mishap."' The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that because the language of the two
investigation regulations did not specify DOD mishaps, the regulations applied
to mishaps in general.' 5' Because prefatory language in the regulation limited
the investigatory requirements to DOD mishaps,'52 the court concluded that
the inclusion of the prefatory language evidenced the drafters' intent that the
entire regulation apply only to DOD mishaps.'"
Arguing in the alternative, the plaintiffs next contended that the crash fell
within the definition of a DOD mishap. DOD instructions define a DOD mis-
hap as "an unplanned event, or series of events, which results in damage to
DOD property. .. ; damage to public and private property or injury and ill-
ness to non-DOD personnel as a result of DOD operations.""'15 The plaintiffs
contended that the phrase "as a result of DOD operations" included any event
145. Black Hills Aviation, 34 F.3d at 972-73 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37).
146. Id. at 973. The plaintiffs also pointed to Army Regulation 385-40 and Department of the
Army Pamphlet 385-95. The court ruled, however, that these regulations simply implemented and
supported DOD Instruction 6055.7, and were not an independent source of authority. Id.
147. The third type of investigation was the type that the Army performed, Army Regulation
15-6. A 15-6 investigation serves to provide the commander with information; its use, scope, and
requirements are discretionary. Id.
148. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(2)(a)(2)(c)).
149. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(2)(a)(2)(a)-(b)).
150. Id. at 974-75.
151. DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(a)(2)(c) reads, "DOD Components shall prepare this type of
investigation report ... whenever a mishap involves one or more of the following: 1. Fatality 2.
Anticipated litigation for or against the government or a government contractor." Id. at 974 (em-
phasis added).
152. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7(E)(2)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing DOD Instruction 6055.7, Attachment 2, Definition 1).
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having a "direct connection with DOD operations.""'
The court, however, concluded that the plaintiffs had interpreted the regu-
lation too broadly.'56 The court reasoned that the plain language of the regu-
lation led to a far narrower construction. The court concluded that the regula-
tion included only events "caused by" DOD operations.'57
The issue then became whether the Army caused the crash.' The court
held that, at least at the time officials selected the type of investigation to be
performed, there was no reason to conclude that the Army was at fault in the
crash.'59 Moreover, without a reason to suspect Army involvement, the
government's decision not to conduct a safety investigation was justified."6
The court reasoned that, absent some indication of Army involvement, a civil-
ian aircraft crash was not the kind of accident that would give the Army in-
sight into the prevention of other accidents.
6'
The court, concluding that the crash was not a DOD Mishap mandating a
legal or safety investigation, held that the scope and manner of the investiga-
tion was a discretionary act under the first prong of the discretionary exception
test. 62 The court then proceeded to the second prong of the test.
Endorsing the district court decision, the court held that the refusal to
investigate the cause of the crash represented the type of policy discretion that
Congress intended to protect. 63 First, the officers, in making their decision,
evaluated the Army's limited resources to investigate accidents within its
control. 6" Second, the officers considered the Army's lack of expertise in
the investigation of technical aspects of an aircraft crash. 65 Third, the offi-
cers considered the importance and need to resume the scheduled missile
testing as soon as possible and without interference."
Finally, the court concluded that the officers' decision to exclude the
Kolbs from the crash site was clearly grounded in military policy not subject
to judicial review. 167 The plaintiff's argument failed because it questioned the
reasonableness of the Army's decision rather than the Army's authority to
make the decision."6






161. Id. at 975-76.
162. Id. at 976.
163. Id. (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The plaintiffs, however, pointed to this factor in the district court and in their briefs
on appeal as evidence of the Army's negligence. The court responded that such military decisions
were the precise reason for the discretionary function exception. Id. (citing Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988)).
167. Id. (citing United States v. Gourly, 502 F.2d 785, 785-87 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that
it is well-recognized that the commander of a military installation has the broad authority and
discretion to summarily exclude persons therefrom)).
168. Id. (noting that the exception clearly states that protection is afforded to the exercise of a
discretionary function "whether or not the discretion involved be abused").
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3. Analysis
Black Hills Aviation fits squarely with a judicial trend favoring govern-
mental immunity under the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The
exception, with its acceptance and application by the courts on the rise, ap-
pears to be swallowing the rule. As Judge McKay observed in his concurring
opinion in Allen v. United States,'69
[i]t undoubtedly will come as a surprise to many that two hundred
years after we threw out King George III, the rule that 'the king can
do no wrong' still prevails at the federal level in all but the most
trivial of matters .... [T]he FICA... is largely a false promise in
all but 'fender benders' and perhaps some cases involving medical
malpractice by government doctors.'
While consistent with the trend toward government immunity,' 7' the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Black Hills Aviation illustrates the vigor with
which a court will seek to apply the exception. For example, the court refused
to characterize the civilian aircraft crash as a DOD Mishap. 7 1 This decision
effectively placed the crash outside the regulation's investigation mandate, a
non-discretionary function. Because the crash did not require an investigation,
the government was simply exercising a discretionary function.
The court interpreted the plain language of the phrase "as a result of' to
mean "caused by.' 73 The court, however, did not elaborate on its preference
for the narrow interpretation, "caused by," over the broader interpretation,
"connected with.' 74 Moreover, while the court stated that the plaintiff's in-
terpretation would give the phrase a broader meaning than its common usage,
the court did not address the alternative argument that the government's inter-
pretation would give the phrase a narrower meaning than its common usage.
More importantly, the plain language of the regulation could logically
support a finding that the damage to private property and to "non-DOD per-
sonnel" was a "result of DOD operations." The ground fires started because of
DOD operations, resulting in the crash of civilian fire suppressing aircraft.
The court also used a stringent definition of "cause" in adopting the
government's "caused by" interpretation.'75 The court believed that the regu-
lation required the government to directly or proximately cause the injury. 76
169. 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
170. Id. at 1424-25.
171. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal
Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871 (1991); see also G. Michael Harz, Com-
ment, The Liability of the United States Government Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 66
DENV. U. L. REV. 601 (1989) (discussing the hardship imposed on a plaintiff who successfully
sued the government for five million dollars, but was required to forgo medical treatment while
the government relitigated the case).
172. Black Hills Aviation, 34 F.3d at 975.
173. Id.
174. The plaintiffs advocated such an interpretation. Id.
175. Id.
176. While the court implied the need for the government to have directly caused the aircraft




The court did not address the possibility that "caused by" could be interpreted
to require a simple "but for" relationship. Using a "but for" analysis, the plain-
tiffs could have argued that but for the government's involvement-the con-
tract with the plaintiff and the request for aerial fire suppression in the missile
range during FAADS operations-the injury to the pilots and the aircraft
would not have occurred. The government's involvement was much greater
than, for example, the case of a random, uninvited aircraft crashing inside the
installation.
Cases such as Black Hills Aviation raise doubt as to whether the law is
serving its own purpose. The avowed goal of the FTCA was to remove the
government's sovereign immunity and to impose tort liability upon the govern-
ment "to the same extent as [to] a private individual under like circumstanc-
es."17 The court's efforts to extend immunity to the government under an
exception, however, erodes the impact of the rule. In fact, the court's willing-
ness to find discretion where it might not otherwise exist does more than
dilute the rule; it contradicts the rule. Holdings defining statutes or regulations
as discretionary increase the scope of activities immune to liability. Holdings
that alter the meanings of words such as "shall"'' 78 or "will', 179 make the
FTCA a game of semantics.
One of the most prominent and widely held justifications for the discre-
tionary function exception was to prevent judicial "second guessing" of legis-
lative acts. 80 However, the court's broad reading and application of the dis-
cretionary function exception does what many sought to avoid: second guess
the legislature. Perhaps dubious of imposing large fiscal liabilities upon the
government, 8' the courts temper the reach of the IFTCA and frustrate the ob-
jectives of the legislature by extending the discretionary function exception be-
yond its original meaning.
The holding in Black Hills Aviation does not deviate from the trend estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court. Nor does the holding depart from
the decisions within the Tenth Circuit. The current interpretation of the discre-
tionary function exception, however, allows the court great latitude to find the
United States exempt from tort liability. The cliche of the "exception swallow-
ing the rule" aptly describes the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
178. See William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 26 (1993); Brackin
v. United States, 913 F.2d 858, 860 (11 th Cir. 1990) (finding that the word "shall" in a regulation
did not mandate one system of crop allotment over another).
179. See Kratzke, supra note 178, at 26; Kelley v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 360-61 (lst
Cir. 1991) (finding DEA departmental manual concerning reporting of wrongful conduct a discre-
tionary writing).
180. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 320 (1991) (noting that the discretionary
function exception "prevent[s] judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions
grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort") (quot-
ing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)).
181. See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984) (noting that courts, when deciding cases brought against the government involving large
requests for damages, should be wary of exposing the government to fiscal liability because of the
effect on the general public).
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CONCLUSION
Through Taylor and Black Hills, the Tenth Circuit has demonstrated a
preference to defer to government expertise. While this stance is logical from
the government's perspective, it leaves many plaintiffs-like the Taylors, who
lost their daughter, and the Kolbs, who lost their son-without a cause of
action. Finally, the court's reluctance to review government decisions increases
the possibility that the government might abuse this broad discretion.
Timothy B. Richards
